This is the ninth installment in a series of interviews with scholars and experts on China as a resurgent Asian power that is changing the regional order. This installment looks into China’s growing nationalism. -- Ed.


China has utilized growing nationalism for domestic purposes such as fostering national unity and reinforcing the governing legitimacy of the Communist Party, China expert Lee Dong-ryul said, calling its nationalism a “state-controlled” one.

Unlike South Korea, the Chinese authorities have led and manipulated nationalism rather than being overwhelmed by it, although it remains uncertain until when the authorities can control it, the professor at Dongduk Women’s University told The Korea Herald.

In negotiations with foreign states, China could use nationalism to raise its bargaining power, but one of the risks is that the nationalist sentiment could reinforce the public discourse about “China threats,” he added, noting that Beijing has been reluctant to overtly talk about nationalism.

“Growing nationalism could serve as a medium to strengthen the negative impression about China. This is part of the reason Beijing believes to a certain extent that it should not bring up the issue of nationalism to outside audiences,” he said.

The nature of China’s nationalism has changed over time as its nationalism was based on the anti-American sentiment in the 1990s and then on its newfound confidence in the 21st century, marked by its economic rise, the scholar pointed out. 

The following is the interview with professor Lee.


Korea Herald: What does nationalism entail for China?
Lee Dong-ryul: China has been reluctant to overtly and directly talk about nationalism. Instead, the Chinese authorities have used the expression “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” which it says refers to the “Chinese dream.” From an objective and academic standpoint, this expression is an allusion to what we generally call nationalism. 

It is evident that nationalism in China has been increasing. The rise of nationalism is quite interesting, given that nationalism, which is usually associated with separatism or independence (for ethnic minorities), could be potentially dangerous for China, which consists of the majority Han Chinese and 55 ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, China has actually been discussing nationalism through the expression, “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” This is quite unique.


KH: In what ways has nationalism in China been rising?
Lee: It was not long ago that China first started to use the expression, the “Chinese nation.” It first appeared in 1997 during the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party when Jiang Zemin was in office. Since then, Chinese authorities have increasingly used the expression. In 2001, when China celebrated the 80th anniversary of the founding of the party, Jiang used the phrase “the Chinese nation” more than 30 times. During the 17th party congress, Hu Jintao also used the phrase repeatedly. 

During the 18th party congress, Xi Jinping talked of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, portraying it as the Chinese dream. Thus, the Chinese government has been talking about the Chinese nation officially and repeatedly. This is one reason I claim that nationalism has been rising.


KH: How has Chinese nationalism translated into action?
Lee: Nationalism in China began surfacing in the 1990s. At the time, China’s nationalism was based on anti-Americanism. Nationalism in the 1990s was, in a sense, “wounded nationalism” or “frustrated nationalism.” In other words, it was nationalism to overcome the 100-year history of humiliation and invasion by foreign imperialists. 

Nationalism emerged immediately after the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Following the crackdown on the protests, the anti-American sentiment deepened as the U.S. imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on China and linked the country’s human rights situation with its treatment of Beijing as the most favored nation in negotiations.

The situation got even worse as China failed to win the right to host the 2000 Olympics only by a slim margin -- because of alleged efforts by the U.S. and Britain to foil China’s bid and support Australia’s application.

In the mid-1990s, the U.S.’ decision to approve a visa for Taiwan’s then-president Lee Teng Hui to visit America frayed ties between the U.S. and China. The friction further worsened in 1999 when NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during the war in Kosovo. The anti-American sentiment increased again during a clash between the U.S. surveillance aircraft and China’s fighter jet off Hainan Island in 2001, which killed a Chinese pilot. All of these cases led to a rise in nationalism.


KH: You mentioned that nationalism is sometimes associated with separatism. Can you be more specific about how this has manifested for China?
Lee: Under the strong bipolar Cold War structure, the ideological competition dominated international politics. But in the post-Cold War era, racial and ethnic issues were brought to the fore, destabilizing the security landscape. Nationalism based on ethnicities, in particular, was associated with separatism and secessionism. 

Given that China is a nation encompassing 55 ethnic minority groups, Beijing could not talk openly about nationalism when the feelings of separatism were growing in the post-Cold War environment. Thus, in the 1990s, China used the term, patriotism rather than nationalism. This is in fact to show that it did carry out a nationalist movement under the disguise of patriotism.


KH: How do you evaluate the current status of China’s nationalism -- or nationalism in the 21st century?
Lee: While China’s nationalism in the 1990s was wounded nationalism, its nationalism in the 21st century has been “confident nationalism” -- one that is based on its newfound confidence stemming from many of its achievements, including its economic rise. 

In 2007, China launched its first moon orbiter, called Chang’e 1. There followed a series of events in the ensuing years to boost China’s national pride, such as the Summer Olympics in Beijing in 2008 and the World Expo in Shanghai in 2010. Especially, at the Expo, China highlighted the rejuvenation of the Chinese people. In a nutshell, China’s nationalism in the 1990s was one that was reminiscent of its wounded past, while its nationalism in the 21st century was something to bolster national pride and confidence.


KH: There could be a kind of nationalism that responds to the view that China is still in the second tier on the world stage despite its remarkable economic achievements. What is your take?
Lee: That is something related to China’s nationalism vis-a-vis Japan, particularly from 2010 to 2012. In 2010, the territorial row between the two neighbors surged as a Chinese fishing boat collided with two Japanese patrol ships near the disputed Senkaku Islands -- or “Diaoyu” in Chinese. Tokyo’s decision in 2012 to nationalize the disputed islands further escalated their already aggravated tensions.

These incidents came as China surpassed Japan in 2010 in terms of gross domestic product. China then started to think it would no longer be forced to make compromises or concessions on foreign policy issues. The Chinese people also appeared to think there was a need to show off the fact that China’s national power has strengthened, and that it no longer lags behind other nations in terms of power. 

This sentiment has also been underscored by President Xi, which then led to a deepening of the anti-Japanese sentiment. Against this backdrop, there were massive anti-Japan protests in 2012 in which some 100,000 Chinese participated. Japanese businesses struggled to avoid the fallout from the rallies. This sort of nationalism against Japan was something different from what was witnessed in the 1990s.


KH: Nationalism could be a tool for Chinese leaders to govern the country. What’s your view?
Lee: What China is apprehensive about with regard to nationalism is the role of nationalist sentiment in further spreading and reinforcing the “China threat” discourse, given that growing nationalism could serve as a medium to strengthen the negative impression about China. This is part of the reason why Beijing believes to a certain extent that it should not bring up the issue of nationalism to outside audiences. But interestingly enough, Chinese leader Xi openly talks about the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which obviously carries nationalistic overtones. I believe this is largely for domestic purposes.

As China began pushing for the policy of reform and opening in the 1980s, it pursued economic growth and development by improving ties with the West or through westernization, so to speak. But this triggered backlashes such as the Tiananmen Square incident. Deng Xiaoping wanted to continue the policy of reform and openness, but the social environment was not conducive to it due to the backlashes and the fading of socialism. As the role of socialism as an ideology to promote social cohesion waned, Chinese authorities needed some new ideology to replace socialism. Here, nationalism emerged under the name of patriotism. China officially used the term patriotism, but it was obviously about nationalism. It was intended to revive China’s historical tradition and inculcate a sense of national pride in the Chinese people. This is one case of China using nationalism as a tool (for domestic purposes).

Another case is that China used the surging nationalism as a way to encourage people to coalesce behind the Communist Party. After the Tiananmen Square incident that triggered U.S.’ sanctions against China and the subsequent increase in anti-Americanism, there was a huge protest in front of the U.S. Embassy. Then, the message that Chinese authorities sent to the protesters was that the problem did not rest with the U.S., but with the fact that China was weak. The authorities said that as China was weak, it could experience yet another century of victimization and humiliation, and that this was the reason people should coalesce and rally behind the party. That was a message of patriotism and loyalty toward the party. 

Now, we face the question of why China rekindles nationalism despite the possibility that the nationalism could further fuel the China threats. I think this is because there is an increasing sense of crisis vis-a-vis China’s political system or the party’s legitimacy. As Xi took power (in 2012), there was concern that China would, after all, face the limits of its growth unless the party embarks on political reform in earnest. The political reform, therefore, couldn’t help but be put atop the policy priority agenda for Xi. 

Xi, however, did not directly carry out the reform. Instead, he pushed for an anticorruption campaign and sought to instill in the Chinese people national pride (through the nationalistic rhetoric), arguing that the Communist Party has made and will make a lot of achievements, and that there is no other entity than the party to do the prodigious undertaking. This has so far been a claim strong enough to persuade the Chinese to trust the party, 

Like this, China has domestically utilized the nationalism to encourage national unity, despite the possibility of its role to propel the talk of the China threat. But externally, China has kept saying that it does not intend to harm any other nation, and that it has historically favored peace and stability. China apparently believes that it can control the spread of the China threat perception. In the 1990s, the Chinese authorities were able to manage and control the rise of nationalism. When nationalism based on anti-Americanism surged, it could get under control when the government stepped in to stop it.


KH: You seem to be suggesting that China is encouraging nationalism for domestic political purposes to a certain extent.
Lee: Yes, China’s nationalism is “official nationalism” or “state nationalism,” so to speak. There are various strands of nationalism. The kind of nationalism that caused division in Europe was ethnic nationalism -- a sort of sentiment that encouraged the movements for independence or separatism. China’s strand is state nationalism wrapped under the rhetoric of the “Chinese nation.” As there is no such thing as “ethnic Chinese,” it is an imaginary community that has been forged by the authorities. It means people living in the Chinese territory, and it is meant to bring Chinese people together -- a reason it can be referred to as state-led nationalism.
 

KH: What are the possible risks or dangers of China’s nationalism?
Lee: Well, the fundamental problems that have threatened or may weaken the legitimacy of the Communist Party would not be addressed even though the party seeks to utilize nationalism to prop up its legitimacy. In other words, the problems would remain unresolved to erode its legitimacy. China now faces a wide range of issues such as income disparities and corruption, and all these issues will not be kept under the rug for good. Without political reform, the party would face the limits of its own. Of course, China is doing things like an anticorruption movement to address the problems, but it still remains to be seen whether these moves are successful.  

Nationalism for China is a double-edged sword. It could be used to raise its bargaining power in negotiations with another country. For example, after the clash in April 2001 between the U.S. and Chinese aircraft, nationalism surged and, in November that year, China got the World Trade Organization’s approval for its accession to the body. This is a case where nationalism helped raise China’s bargaining power.

But in a 2010 clash between China and Japan over the Senkau/Diaoyu Islands, China’s response triggered the negative impression that it was increasingly assertive, and this apparently reinforced the China threat in public discourse. However, China’s nationalism seems to be within the confines of the Chinese authorities’ control.

What should be noted here is that when a government engages in negotiations amidst heightened nationalism, it could hardly make a compromise or its flexibility would be constrained due to the high public expectations about the outcome. But China’s case seems to be different.

Some two years after the diplomatic row surfaced in September 2012 over Tokyo’s nationalization of the disputed islands, China tried to find an exit out of the conflict without resolving the case by pressing Japan to withdraw its decision to nationalize the islands. China sought a summit with Japan on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in November 2014. Such moves did not trigger any massive anti-Japanese protests. This is quite an incomprehensible situation in a democracy like South Korea. The case shows that the Chinese authorities are in control of nationalism.

Usually, when a democratic country engages in negotiations against the backdrop of rising nationalism, it can hardly back down or do anything to appear weak in the eyes of the public, which makes it difficult for the government to exert flexibility in negotiations. This is true for South Korea. But China’s case is different, as it seems to be still capable of controlling nationalism. But we never know until when the Chinese authorities can control the public sentiment, when people quickly exchange their thoughts and feelings through social media.


KH: As China consists of the majority Han Chinese and 55 ethnic minorities, it may not be easy to bring all of them together through nationalistic rhetoric. What is your view?
Lee: Tibet and Xinjiang Uygur are the most problematic regions of the nation. But the possibility of their independence is very slim, and Xi is very confident about it.  

Right before the 2008 Olympics, Tibetan activists carried out a very aggressive independence movement, which only resulted in a deeper isolation of Tibet. While watching the movement, the majority Han Chinese thought that the Tibetan movement could hamper the country’s crucial events such as the Olympics, and such a thought further strengthened the unity among the Han Chinese. As Tibet slipped deeper into isolation, the activists’ movement grew more intense with some setting themselves on fire -- although Tibet has traditionally resorted to nonviolent means of protest. The Chinese authorities carried out a stern crackdown on them and such a crackdown was possible because of the support from the majority of the Chinese people.  

The situation in Xinjiang Uygur is even worse. The U.S. used to call activists from the region “freedom fighters,” but it has called them terrorists since the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. The international community started to recognize the activists as terrorists, giving the Chinese authorities the legitimate right to crack down on them. 

By Song Sang-ho (sshluck@heraldcorp.com)


** Lee Dong-ryul

●Lee, a professor in the Department of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women’s University, is noted for his extensive research on China’s foreign policy, nationalism and ethnic minorities.

●He was a policy adviser to the Unification Ministry and visiting scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University. He also worked as a senior member of a research panel of Korean and Chinese experts.

●He has authored or coauthored many books and articles, including “China’s Policy and Influence on the North Korea Nuclear Issue” (2010), “The Purpose and Restrictions of China’s Participation in Peacekeeping Activities” (2014) and “China’s Territorial Disputes” (2008).

●Lee obtained his bachelor’s and master’s degrees from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in 1986 and 1988, respectively. He earned his Ph.D. in politics from Peking University in 1996.